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Resolving Mauritania’s crisis

By Tony Okerafor

Instead of having unilaterally-led elections, there will be now … a multi-party election in transparency, in a balanced manner, so that while overcoming the crisis, Mauritania would be, at the same time, deepening its democratic practices and culture."

(Langtani Lamamra, the African Union’s Commissioner for Peace and Security, speaking to a foreign radio reporter, Wednesday, June 3).

Mauritanian, a country located along Africa’s west coast, is one of the continents largest, geographically. With a population of just over 3.5 million, it nevertheless ranks as one of the sub-region’s least populous states. However, one thing it has that only a few countries within the sub-region possess is almost an equal mix of ethnic Arab tribes and darker-skinned indigenous African tribes.

Mauritania is a former colony of France: its official language is Arabic, which is spoken by the country’s ruling class.

Since 2005, this partly-desert country has not left the radar of the world community for two main reasons. Firstly, it used to be home to one of the longest dictatorship in Africa. Secondly, it has remained one of the very few countries anywhere on the continent, and indeed, around the wider international community, where the military still holds sway.

Nearly four years ago, the army intervened to end the 22 years old dictatorship of President Seed Maouya Ahmed Ali Ould Taya. Popular support for the coup inside Mauritania, as well as some degree of acquiescence by many foreign governments, enabled the coup leader, Col. Mohammed Val and his colleagues to set up a transition government dominated and effectively run by the military, lasting over two-and-half years.

In August, 2007, the military authorities organized what was seen as the country’s first real attempt at holding true multi-party elections. Incidentally, Col. Val or any of his lieutenants did not stand in those polls, which produced President Seed Ould Sheikh Abdoulahi as Mauritania’s first freely elected leader. After less than nine months in office, the military struck again, overthrowing Mr. Abdoulahi in the process.

The leader of the new junta, General Mohammed Ould Abdul Aziz, accused the elected civilian government of corruption, nepotism and of trying to divide the country. The international community was unconvinced. From the United Nations, to the African Union [A.U] to the Arab League, ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States], opposition to the coup of ten months ago has been unanimous. From the all-powerful European Union, on which Mauritania relies a great deal for economic and technical support, to the union of Francophone countries, which has been highly influential across many parts of Africa due to the involvement of the French, everyone had pretty much decided that General Aziz and his supporters would not be allowed to remain in power.

But, the decision of Mauritania’s immediate neighbours not to be follow old ways by breaking ranks with the rest of the world on an issue like this has proved to be a critical important factor in bringing about the good news that has been emerging over the crisis in Mauritania since Tuesday, June 2, 2009. One such neighbour is Senegal, which has been hosting peace talks between Mauritania’s military authorities, led by General Aziz, and the opposition. In a way that he’s not bothered to hound coup-makers in neighbouring Guinea-Conakry, Senegali president Abdoulahi Wade, has been uncompromising in his criticism of the Aziz regime.

But, the man whose opposition to the military junta in Mauritania has received the most publicity is Libya’s leader and A.U. chairman, Col. Moamma Qadafi. Since as the chairman of the continental body, the influential Libyan strongman has been to Nouakchott, Mauritania’s capital, and invited the disputing parties over to Tripoli, a number of times, basically to twist their arms and bang their heads together.

Col. Qadafi has not been equally as willing to take on the military junta in Guinea Conakry at least publicly. Even in Mauritania’s case, he has warned the western world and others to "stop interfering in Mauritania’s internal affairs". Having said that, however, the Libyan leader, who himself came to power via a coup back in 1969, is reported to have warned General Aziz that he could not count on Libya’s support, if he chose to defy the international community on the question of returning Mauritania to multi-party democracy as soon as possible.

Well, those concerted pressures by the international community did indeed yield some dividend early this month, June 2 to be precise, when the military rulers in the embattled West African finally agreed to postpone the special presidential election, originally scheduled to hold Saturday, June 6. The political opposition had almost unanimously resolved to boycott the polls. But, by agreeing to sign up to the deal, the opposition parties had in effect accepted to participate.

Brokered in Senegal, the new agreement recognizes the longstanding agitation of the Mauritanian opposition for a delay in the polls, as a condition for taking part. The deal fixed July 18 as the date for the election. The agreement designed to end Mauritania’s ten-month-old political crisis, does, in principle, divide a newly constituted "transitional government of national unity" between the military authorities and their opponents. President Cheik Abdoulahi’s removal by General Aziz happened in August, last year; and now, the new power-sharing deal stipulated that Mr. Abdoulahi, the ousted leader will lead the transitional government, but, not before he has formally resigned his post as the elected head of state. The agreement also mandated General Aziz to name the prime minister of the new government, along with 14 other ministers. The remaining ministerial portfolios, 15 in all, including interior, finance and information, are to be divided between Mr. Abdoulahi’s National Front for the Defence of Democracy, in effect the ruling party until the 2008 coup, and the opposition Alliance of Democratic Forces.

The agreement, whose official signing ceremony took place in Nouakchott, Mauritania, on Wednesday, June 3, came on the heels of arduous negotiations in Dakar, Senegal, backed by the A.U.., the Arab League, the E.U., the Francophone and the U.N. For nearly a year, the military junta in Nouakchott has refused demands by the A.U. to reinstate President Abdoulahi. Instead, they changed the constitution, in order that retired military officers can run for office.

The general has been campaigning on a slogan of "constructive change", promising to fight corruption and improve Mauritania’s infrastructure. It is also clear that the opposition have had to drop their insistence that neither the general nor any member of his military junta should be allowed torn for president.

At the same time, however, the decision of the political opposition to drop their boycott has meant that General Aziz will now face more serious challengers in the July 18 vote. Even at that he’s still seen as the front-runner. Equally, he now has the opportunity to contest an election that is, most probably, more legitimate than the botched polling of Saturday, June 6—an exercised that has been widely criticized by the international community.

If no candidate is able to win an absolute majority on July 18, namely by reaching the 50 per cent threshold, the June 2 deal calls for a second round of balloting on August 1.

E-mail tonyoke2008@yahoo.com

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Ivory Coast and reconciliation

In March 4, 2007, the two main actors in the Ivory Coast crisis signed the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (OPA). The deal initially produced a peaceful atmosphere. The demarcation line between the armed forces was dismantled, a new government formed and the groundwork laid for addressing the conflict’s key questions: Ivorian identity and citizenship, and presidential legitimacy. Yet, more than two years later, the OPA is in deep trouble. The conflict will only be resolved if the commitments made in the Burkinabé capital are finally translated into action. Organising credible elections will not be enough to rescue ivory Coast from a decade-long crisis; substantial progress in the disarmament process and genuine reunification of the administration are also needed. President Compaoré’s facilitation needs to generate new momentum, and other international partners must increase their pressure.

Political leaders have been pushed to the wall, with less than a half-year left to organise free and transparent elections as agreed and proceed with disarming thousands of combatants. Another postponement of elections would be a death blow to the OPA. If armed groups are not at least partially dismantled, there will be a severe risk of new unrest.

Electoral registration and identification were officially closed on 30 June, but the operation did not reach its initial aim. Launched in September 2008, the complex operation has been ill-conceived and mismanaged, its financing deliberately hampered by President Gbagbo, who has a vested interest in delaying the elections as much as possible. Following yet another postponement on November 30, 2008, the UN Security Council in January 2009 demanded that Ivorian leaders provide a realistic electoral timetable. In May, a new date for what is likely to be the first round of presidential elections was finally announced. But that date – November 29, 2009 – is still uncertain. To meet it, the institutions in charge of organising the vote still have a great deal to do and must dramatically improve their procedures.

Delays in the OPA’s other priorities also give cause for concern. Disarmament has been limited to a few instances of small arms destruction. Both sides maintain significant forces and continue to import military equipment, in violation of the UN arms embargo. This poses a real threat to the electoral process, since they can intimidate voters and possibly manipulate results or violently contest them. 5,000 Forces Nouvelles ex-rebel combatants are still awaiting integration into the new army, and the military zone commanders ("com’zones") in the formerly insurgent north retain personal protection units with hundreds of fighters. A 20,000-strong militia of Gbagbo loyalists is yet to be dismantled, and his "young patriots" networks in Abidjan have not been dissolved.

There has been only partial unification of the government administration throughout the country. On May 26, the "com’zones" relinquished their administrative powers to government-appointed prefects, a symbolic step that needs to be followed up by giving the prefects adequate financial and logistical means to restore genuine civilian state authority. It is worrying that the "com’zones" have only lost their administrative responsibilities, while retaining their security powers, particularly since they no longer take orders from Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, the former insurgent leader, who is struggling to preserve the unity of his fractious movement. Moreover, Ivory’ Coast’s economy is in bad shape, due to poor governance as much as the global crisis. As poverty increases, thousands of young men are inclined to keep their weapons or even tempted to start a new insurgency.

The wider international community and the UN are weary and nearly helpless witnesses of these challenges. Excluded from the negotiation of the OPA – signed exclusively by African leaders – financial support is their only leverage. In view of the extensive delays and remaining difficulties of the peace process, some have started to question their continued involvement. France, for example, has already begun to repatriate a significant part of the troops it deployed under "Operation Licorne". The Burkinabé facilitation is in the thankless position of being almost alone to arbitrate disputes and create new momentum. With a rapid countdown to elections required, it must be firmer, particularly towards the "com’zones" and the ruling party’s militias.

The following measures must be taken to advance peace in 2009:

On the electoral process

Data processing, including opening the planned 68 data processing centres, must start as soon as possible. The Independent Electoral Commission and the commercial technical body that has been hired must present a detailed plan for distributing polling cards and launch an information campaign to give people precise information on where and how to get them. The Prime Minister must supervise the electoral process and surround himself with a more competent team able to coordinate it.

On disarmament

Gbagbo and Soro must take responsibility to speed up the integration of their respective forces into the joint police and gendarmerie and to start reform of the national army, which is supposed to take in 5,000 ex-rebels. Both sides must finally engage in real disarmament by registering and giving up their weapons and ammunition in parallel.

On administrative reunification

Prime Minister Soro should strengthen his cabinet with more experienced and competent staff. A single administration is needed in the entire country by year’s end. Prefects and mayors must receive adequate financial and logistical means to restore civilian state authority in former rebel zones. The northern boundary should be secured by state police and customs officers, rather than former rebels.

The UN Security Council should increase pressure on Ivorian leaders and France make resumption of full cooperation conditional on free and transparent elections and a peaceful post-electoral period. The Burkinabé facilitation should be reinforced and, with Soro’s help, negotiate directly with each "com’zone" over their integration and work with Gbagbo to dismantle his various militias.

•Culled from http://www.crisisgroup.org/